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RECENT DECISIONS
Agency - Fiduciary Duty - Corporate Contracts
Plaintiff corporation, in acquiring substantially all the assets of
Fifteen Oil Company of which the defendant Cain was president,
allowed Cain to receive $57,500.00 severance pay for consideration
expressed by Fifteen in the following letter agreement:
that [Cain] . . . will be available to [plaintiff] . . . in a retained capacity
for a period of six (6) months from and after May 2, 1960, in order
that there will be no abrupt change in management and in order that
[plaintiff] . . . may avail [itself] . . . of his special knowledge con-
cerning the affairs and properties of Fifteen Oil Company.'
About five months later, Cain, as "agent and attorney-in-fact" for
his father, wrote the plaintiff a letter pointing out the latter's failure
to comply with the terms of a lease of oil properties (in which Cain's
father owned twenty-five per cent of the mineral interest). Copies of
the letter were sent to some twenty other owners of the mineral inter-
est who suddenly demanded compliance. The plaintiff chose to sur-
render the lease. Soon after the surrender, Cain's father conveyed his
interest to Cain, who then sold it for more than $40,000.00. Plaintiff
sued Cain for breach of fiduciary duty in that he took advantage of
his special knowledge and his confidential relationship, to the detri-
ment of the plaintiff. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $ 57,750.00;
but the court of civil appeals, finding error in one of the special issues
submitted to the jury, reversed the trial court and remanded the
case for a new trial. Held, affirmed:' The contract for severence pay
was an arm's length transaction which concerned only the giving of
advice upon request. Such a corporate contract for consultation will
not create a fiduciary duty beyond "the framework of the agreement."
The scope of agency involves at least two concepts: first, the
authority of the agent to act for his principal; and second, the duty
of the agent to act in the interests of his principal. The former stems
from common law contracts.! The latter involves the civil law notion
of fiduciary duty adopted originally by equity.! Since the granting
'Reproduced in the principal case, Tennessee-Louisiana Oil Co. v. Cain, 400 S.W.2d
318, 320 (Tex. 1966).
a The Texas Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to grant any relief to Cain because
he filed no application for writ of error.
aFERSON, AGENCY 7-9 (1954). See also SEAVEY, AGENCY 32-36 (1964).
'See Kinzback Tool Co., Inc. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d
509, 512-13 (1942), quoted both in FERSON, supra note 3, at 413 n. 49 and in the dis-
senting opinion in Tennessee-Louisiana Oil Co. v. Cain, 400 S.W.2d 318, 328 (Tex. 1966).
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of authority to act for oneself is usually accompanied by the sharing
of confidential knowledge, and since reliance on the agent's action
usually relaxes the principal into inaction, authority and duty are
traditional mates. In the principal case, in fact, the court admitted
that a fiduciary relationship existed as to the consultation expressed
in the agreement, but it emphasized that Cain was under no duty
to refrain from acting adversely to the corporation's interest in areas
where no authority was granted.
Fiduciary duty, however, is not always limited to the authority
granted in an agency agreement.! An agent with an express con-
tractual duty may place himself in such a position of trust to his
principal that loyalty beyond the contractual terms is required.! In
the principal case four dissenting judges found this situation to exist.
Justice Griffin, writing the dissent, used several sections of the "Plan
of Reorganization" to justify the plaintiff's assumption that Cain
would act in its best interests concerning the former properties of
Fifteen. The evidence is impressive.
Nevertheless, the majority refused to expand the limited fiduciary
relationship expressed in the letter agreement. Certainly the plaintiff
suffered the traditional handicap of a sophisticated and experienced
corporation seeking help in equity. What might have been a breach
of duty to an elderly widow was here merely clever business tactics.'
Tennessee-Louisiana Oil Co. v. Cain should place corporate coun-
sels on the alert. Where a confidential relationship is in fact expected
to result from a business contract, it must be expressed in definite
terms to the full extent desired.
J.H.W.
'See definitions cited in dissenting opinion in Tennessee-Louisiana Oil Co. v. Cain,
400 S.W.2d 318, 328 (Tex. 1966).
eSee SEAVY, supra note 3, at 235. See also Kinzback Tool Co., Inc. v. Corbett-Wallace
Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942) (employee's duty to disclose conflict of in-
terests) and Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786, 120 A.L.R. 20 (1938)
(partner's fiduciary duty when selling his interest to another partner).
'Cf. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Willis, 152 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1946) (Broker of oil leasee
has a fiduciary duty not to buy land to the detriment of his principal.); Patterson v.
Getz, 111 P.2d 842 (Or. 1941) (Son-in-law who handled accounts for parents-in-law had
a special duty to manage the accounts fairly.); and cases cited note 6 supra. Boyd v.
Eikenberry, 132 Tex. 408, 122 S.W.2d 1045 (1939) and Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex.
115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A. 405 (1888), also cited by the court, discuss only the authority
aspect of agency.
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Antitrust - Horizontal Grocery Chain Merger Invali-
dated Under Clayton Act, Section 7
Von's Grocery Company, a large retail grocery chain in the Los
Angeles area, acquired Shopping Bag Food Stores, a competing chain.
Each company occupied a leading position in the Los Angeles retail
grocery market, and in 1960 their combined sales were 7.5% of the
area's total retail grocery sales. According to one view, less than one
per cent of effective competition was foreclosed by the combination.1
The United States brought an action charging that the merger vio-
lated section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits asset or stock
mergers resulting in a substantial lessening of competition After
refusing the Government's motion for a temporary restraining order,
the district court concluded as a matter of law that there was not a
reasonable probability that competition would be lessened so as to
violate section 7.' The Government appealed directly to the Supreme
Court.4 Held, reversed: When a market exhibits a decline in the num-
ber of small business units and when a trend toward oligopolistic
concentration is shown, courts must prevent further concentration by
arresting competition-reducing mergers in their incipiency. United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1478 (1966).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act has been used to invalidate horizontal,
vertical, and conglomerate mergers.5 Originally directed toward stock-
acquisition mergers between directly competing companies,' the sec-
tion as amended in 1950 can now apply to any combination which
tends toward a substantial lessening of competition.! Because the pro-
'See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
86 Sup. Ct. 1478, 1493 (1966).
a The section now reads in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
64 Stat 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1963), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
a United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
4 This procedure is authorized by § 2 of the Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1963).
'See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), Note, 12 Sw. L.J.
128 (1958); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), Note, 20 Sw. L.J.
192 (1966).
eArrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); FTC v.
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1926); United States v. Celanese Corp. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 14, 17 (1950); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging
of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 229-30 (1960); Note, Reciprocal Dealing
in Conglomerate Mergers, 20 Sw. L.J. 192, 193-96 (1966).
7 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 n. 31 (1962), Note, 17 Sw. L.J.
286 (1963).
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vision is primarily concerned with the probability that competition
will be lessened, a "reasonable probability" criterion is often applied
by the courts!8
The majority justified the decision by reciting the congressional
purpose of protecting small businessmen and by painting a picture of
Gargantuan chains gobbling up small "Mom and Pop" grocery stores.'
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan in a dissenting
opinion, took issue with the majority's finding that competition would
be lessened.1" Stewart viewed the decline of single-store operators and
the chain store entry of the grocery market as "the result of tran-
scending social and technological changes."" Continuing population
growth, ease of market entry, entry and exit of competing small
chains are all cited by the dissent as factors that belie a finding of
lessening competition.
The decision in Von's Grocery points out a possible fault in the
Court's attitude in antitrust cases. For certain market situations, some
degree of imperfect competition may be the most accurate and work-
able economic norm." When dealing with such a market, the Court
should not automatically apply the maxims of a "perfect competition"
market model, for doing so may actually cause a decline in effective
competitive force." The presence of chain stores within the Los
Angeles retail grocery market, for example, should perhaps have been
accepted as an economic fact of life. Invalidating a merger which
forecloses competition in less than one per cent of total area sales and
which has market-extension overtones may not be a wise imple-
mentation of congressional antitrust purposes.1" At the least, it sets a
new quantitative low for governmental action."
T.M.J.
8"The concept of reasonable probability conveyed by these words ['may be'] is a
necessary element in any statute which seeks to arrest restraints of trade in their in-
cipiency .... " S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950). See note 2 supra for
the relevant text of § 7.
'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1478, 1479-83 (1966), reversing
233 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
10 86 Sup. Ct. at 1485-96 (Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinion).
'Id. at 1488 (Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinion).
""Horizontal and vertical integration will often serve to limit monopoly or destroy
it. . . . The possibility that integration or diversification may be the response of one's
business neighbors is one of the most potent of all forces maintaining competition in our
economy." Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 27, 47 (1949).
" Ibid. "In a sense, the defendants are being punished for the sin of aggressive compe-
tition." 86 Sup. Ct. at 1493 (Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinion).
'Id. at 1492 (Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinion). See note 1 supra.
15 Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) with United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1478 (1966). In Tampa Electric the Court re-
garded a market foreclosure of 0.77% as "quite insubstantial." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., supra, at 331-33.
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Conflict of Laws- Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support - "The Runaway Pappy Act"
A woman (W) in Kentucky obtained a judgment for support
against the father (M) of her illegitimate child. M defaulted in his
payments and went to Texas. W initiated proceedings in Kentucky
under the Kentucky version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act.' In all states, the act provides for a two-state
procedure which enables the deserted dependant (W) to initiate
proceedings at home while the "runaway pappy" is prosecuted in his
new domicile by the district attorney. At the time the instant case
was decided, the Texas act' allowed W to sue for support using
either the law of her domicile or that of M's. W chose to use Ken-
tucky law, and a trial court in Texas ordered M to pay future sup-
port. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that it was improper
to apply Kentucky law, that the Kentucky judgment was not final
and thus not entitled to full faith and credit, and that the lower
court's decision denied M equal protection under the laws since a
father in Texas is not required to support his illegitimate children.'
Held, reversed: W is allowed a choice of law; the Kentucky adjudica-
tion as to M's duty to provide support is final; and a state may reason-
ably classify its citizens and apply different laws with respect to
such classification without violating the Equal Protection Clause.'
Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 402 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1966).
The court held that the express language of the Texas act then in
effect allowed W a choice of using either Texas or Kentucky law.
Also, the Kentucky judgment was viewed as a final one with regard
to M's duty to provide support even though the amount of support
payments might have varied. Finally, M was not denied equal pro-
tection under the laws by the act even though Texas laws do not
call for support of illegitimate children. M had fostered his illegitimate
child in Kentucky, a state which requires such support, and M
therefore could not escape his obligation by fleeing to Texas.
The statutory law upon which the Bjorgo case was decided has
been subsequently amended." The new act no longer allows the
1 Ky. REV. STAT. § 407 (1962). All states and territories and the District of Columbia
now have similar legislation.
'Former art. 2328b, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1964).
3 391 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
" The act provides for such classification in that a "runaway pappy" is still bound by
his previously incurred support obligations although state laws in his present domicile may
be less stringent.
ITEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-4 (Supp. 1965). For a discussion of the appel-
late decision of the Bjorgo case in the light of the amended act, see 19 Sw. L.J. 801 (1965).
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obligee to apply the law of her state regardless of where the obligor
may have been at the time. Instead, the applicable law is now that
of the state where the obligor was present during the period for
which support is sought. Thus, only Texas law will apply for the
period that the "runaway pappy" lives in Texas.
However, if a case similar to Bjorgo should arise under the new
act, W would still be victorious because a foreign judgment was
involved. The new act provides for registration of foreign judgments.
Thus, the more cumbersome method, utilized in Bjorgo under the
old act, of having a Texas adjudication as to the defendant's duty
to support is eliminated. In such an instance, a responding Texas
court will honor the original foreign judgment and need only
ascertain the amount of accrued support.
G.W.O.
Mortgages - Deed of Trust - Dragnet Clause -
Limitation on Subsequently Acquired Third-Party Debts
Parker Square State Bank loaned Lincoln Enterprises the sum of
$125,000 in exchange for a promissory note and a deed of trust on
land. The deed of trust contained a "dragnet" clause which pro-
vided that the land would also stand as security for "all other indebt-
edness which may accrue and become owing in the future." There-
after, as security for a $50,000 loan from Wood, Lincoln executed
a deed of trust to Wood covering the same land. Still later, Lincoln
executed an unsecured note to Horton, which was subsequently pur-
chased from Horton by Parker Square State Bank. Lincoln defaulted
on all three notes and the bank foreclosed, claiming that the "drag-
net" clause in the bank's deed of trust created a priority in the
Horton note over the note held by Wood. The trial court and court
of civil appeals1 so ruled. Held, reversed: In the absence of clear and
unmistakable language to the contrary, a dragnet provision applies
only to obligations contemplated by and arising directly between
the two original parties to the deed of trust, not to subsequently
acquired third-party debts. Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400
S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966).
The early case of Freiburg v. Magale' established that by the addi-
1Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 390 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
270 Tex. 116, 7 S.W. 684 (1888).
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tion of a dragnet clause a mortgage could be made to secure future
debts, and such mortgage would be good "not only between the
parties but as to purchasers from the mortgagee with notice of the
mortgage." The broad language employed seemed to indicate that
a mortgagee who was blessed with a dragnet clause, in effect had
a blank check to include any later obligation, however obtained,
within the protection of the original security. The more recent
decision of Moss v. Hipp limited this doctrine insofar as it applied
to assignees of the mortgagee. The court refused to allow the
mortgagee's assignee to utilize the mortgage to secure an earlier
unsecured debt, reasoning that it was not within the contemplation
of the original parties that the earlier unsecured debt would be
secured by the mortgage. In the instant case, this same "contempla-
tion" reasoning was used in declaring that the more reasonable con-
struction of the clause was that it referred only to obligations arising
directly between Lincoln and the bank. Frieburg was distinguished
upon its facts which clearly indicated an intention that the clause
should cover all future obligations and not merely those presently
contemplated by the parties.
The instant case should not be regarded as establishing the rule
that subsequently purchased third-party obligations are outside the
ambit of the dragnet clause. It should be viewed, however, as creating
a presumption that debt obligations subsequently obtained from a
third party are not within the contemplation of the parties when they
agree to such a clause. Left unanswered is the question of what evi-
dence is sufficient to overcome this presumption. It appears likely that
such a presumption can be overcome only by express words that third-
party obligations are included. Regardless of the mechanics of appli-
cation, the case has commendably placed a limitation on the broad
general rule of Frieburg, thereby eliminating a potentially fertile area
for fraud.
I.B.E.
Procedure - Appeal From Temporary Injunction Is-
sued by Probate Court
Alice National Bank, the proponent of a will ordered to probate,
appealed to the district court from a temporary injunction issued by
a county court judge, sitting in probate. The temporary injunction
3387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965).
[Vol. 20
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had enjoined the bank from taking any action in a district court that
would have interfered with the enforcement of orders issued by the
county court. A motion by the contestant of the will to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction of the district court was overruled,
and the district court judge ordered that the temporary injunction
be vacated. The court of civil appeals affirmed.1 Held, reversed: An
appeal from a temporary injunction issued by a county judge sitting
in a probate matter, designed to protect his jurisdiction, lies to the
court of civil appeals, not the district court. Turcotte v. Alice Nat'l
Bank, 402 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. 1966).
Article 2251 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes' provides that
appeals from orders of county courts granting or dissolving tempo-
rary injunctions are controlled by the title "Injunctions." Article
4662, which is part of title 76 relating to injunctions, provides for
appeal to the court of civil appeals from a temporary injunction.
Rule 385 (d)," the rule form of article 4662, states that such an appeal
does not "suspend the order appealed from, unless it shall be so
ordered by the court or judge entering the order."' On the other hand,
under section 28 of the Probate Code' appeals may be taken to the
district court from the probate court. In the instant case, however,
an appeal under section 28 "would operate to suspend the temporary
injunction and the matter would have to be considered anew by the
district court."' Since the court determined that the purpose of the
temporary injunction issued by the probate court is ordinarily to
preserve the status quo of parties in pending litigation, the statutes
and related rules of civil procedure were deemed to control over the
Probate Code provision. The court, however, did limit its decision to
cases involving temporary injunctions issued in aid of the probate
court's jurisdiction.!
P.R.K.
1Turcotte v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 394 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
2 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2251 (1964).
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4662 (Supp. 1965).4 TEX. R. CIV. P. 385(d).
5 Ibid.
6TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 28 (1956).
'Turcotte v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 402 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. 1966).
, This use of the temporary injunction is to be distinguished from cases where the
ultimate relief sought is a permanent injunction.
1966]
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Wills - Witnesses - Self-Proving Clause
Boren executed a typewritten document purported to be his last
will and testament. The document was not attested by two witnesses
as required by section 50 of the Texas Probate Code.' Attached to the
probated will was a self-proving affidavit with the names of the testa-
tor and two witnesses subscribed, which referred to the typewritten
document as the will of Boren. The trial court admitted the will to
probate, finding that the signatures to the self-proving provision were
sufficient to comply with the requirements of section 59. The court
of civil appeals affirmed.' Held, reversed: Attesting witnesses must
sign the will itself; their signatures on an attached self-proving affi-
davit do not suffice for purposes of attestation. Boren v. Boren, 402
S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
Section 59 requires that a will be signed by the testator and attested
by two or more credible witnesses.! It further provides that, through
certain statutory formalities, the will may be made self-proved; that
is, the testimony of the witnesses in the probate court will be un-
necessary.
In McGrew v. Bartlett,' the testator had not signed the instrument
purporting to be a will. The proponent of the instrument argued that
the proper execution of the self-proving clause operated to publish
and validate the unexecuted will. The court rejected the contention
and held that the self-proving clause neither merged in the will nor
amounted to a republication of the unexecuted will.!
In the instant case, the court was faced with only a slight variation
of McGrew. Here the testator had signed the will but the witnesses
had not. The proponent argued that the witnesses to the self-proving
clause should suffice as attesting witnesses to the will. The court re-
jected this reasoning and firmly drew the line between the will and
the self-proving affidavit. As the court stated: "The execution of a
1 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Supp. 1965).2 Boren v. Boren, 394 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
'TEX. PROB. CoDE ANN. § 59 (Supp. 1965): "Every last will and testament, except
where otherwise provided by law, shall be in writing and signed by the testator in person
or by another person for him by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly
in the handwriting of the testator, be attested by two (2) or more credible witnesses above
the age of fourteen (14) years who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own hand-
writing in the presence of the testator .. "
4 Ibid. ". . . Such a will or testament may, at the time of its execution or at any
subsequent date during the life time of the testator and the witnesses, be made self-
proved, and the testimony of the witnesses in the probate thereof may be made un-
necessary, by the affidavits of the testator and the attesting witnesses, made before an
officer authorized to take acknowledgments to deeds of conveyance and to administer oaths
under the laws of this state. ... "




valid will is a condition precedent to the usefulness of the self-
proving provisions of section 59. A testamentary document to be
self-proved, must first be a will."' The decision reaffirms the court's
reluctance to relax statutory formalities in the making of testimentary
instruments.
G.M.L.
Workmen's Compensation - Extraterritorial Injury
Provision - Status of a Texas Employee
Dossey instituted suit in Texas claiming recovery under the extra-
territorial injury provision of the Texas Workmen's Compensation
Law, article 8306, section 19,' for injuries received in New Mexico
in the course of his employment. A Texas resident, Dossey had made
an informal contract in Texas with a Texas drilling company to work
as a roughneck. The terms of the contract did not clearly specify
whether he would be working in Texas and New Mexico or just in
New Mexico, but his first work situs was in New Mexico. After four
weeks, he returned to Texas for three days. On completion of his work
in Texas, he returned to another location in New Mexico where he suf-
fered a serious injury. The trial court and the court of civil appeals'
allowed recovery. Held:' Even though his first work situs is outside
the state of Texas, an employee injured in another state can recover
under the Texas compensation statute if he has the "status of a Texas
employee." An employee acquires such status if he is hired in Texas to
work in Texas and in another state as the circumstances of his em-
ployer may require. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402
S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1966).
Article 8306, section 19, provides: "If an employee, who has been
hired in this State, sustain[s] injury in the course of his employment
he shall be entitled to compensation according to the Law of this State
even though such injury was received outside of the State .... ." The
statute has been construed ' as requiring that an employee must have
7 Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. 1966).
1Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art 8306, § 19 (1956).
'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 387 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
a The Supreme Court of Texas agreed that the first work situs was not controlling in
determining status, but they reversed and remanded the case for the jury to decide if the
contract was for employment in Texas and New Mexico or just in New Mexico.
4 For an exhaustive review of these cases see Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150
Tex. 215, 239 S.W.2d 608 (1951).
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the "status of a Texas employee" before he is entitled to any benefits
under the provision. In Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n,' the
Texas Supreme Court interpreted the previous case of Southern
Underwriters v. Gallagher' as holding that a workman cannot acquire
the status of a Texas employee if he has not in fact performed services
for his employer in Texas before doing so in another state. This
technical requirement was expressly rejected in the instant case. The
court, recognizing the misinterpretation of Gallagher, held that the
employee acquires the necessary status if he is hired to work in Texas
as well as in another state, and this status is not lost even though he
first works in the other state.
When the contract of employment does not specifically state where
the work is to be performed, the matter of status under the extra-
territorial injury provision is a fact question to be determined by the
jury upon submission of special issues. The court suggested that the
issue be submitted in terms of whether under his employment con-
tract the employee was hired to work in Texas as well as in the other
state. The instant case clarifies an area previously burdened with un-
certainty and provides a workable test for determining status under
the extraterritorial injury provision.
J.A.M.
Workmen's Compensation -Wife Entitled To Re-
cover for Nursing Services Rendered Her Husband
Polk sustained a serious injury in 1961 which rendered him com-
pletely helpless. He required constant attention as he was unable to
eat, drink, or attend to his bodily needs without aid. Transport In-
surance Company voluntarily commenced paying Polk for the em-
ployment of a qualified nurse who worked ten hours each day for six
days of each week and four hours on Sunday. However, Transport
refused to furnish nursing services for the remainder of each day, and
such services were supplied by Polk's wife. Upon Transport's refusal
to pay Mrs. Polk the value of the nursing services rendered by her,
she filed a claim under article 8306, section 7 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.' The board denied the claim but the district court
reversed and rendered a judgment for Mrs. Polk for $6,500. The
'150 Tex. 215, 239 S.W.2d 608 (1951).
6135 Tex. 141, 136 S.W.2d 590 (1940).
'TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1965).
[Vol. 20
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court of civil appeals affirmed Held, affirmed: If an employer or in-
surer refuses to furnish nursing services required by article 8306, sec-
tion 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee's wife,
after furnishing such services, is entitled to recover their reasonable
value. Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966).
1966).
Section 7 provides that if the insuring association fails to furnish
reasonable nursing care to an injured employee, the person who sup-
plies such nursing services shall be entitled to compensation.' Whether
an employee's wife can recover under this provision for rendering
services to her husband is a question of first impression in Texas.
Decisions in other jurisdictions have refused recovery to a wife for
rendering "ordinary" services to her injured husband, such as giving
him prescribed medicine or assisting him in and out of bed, the
rationale being that the wife is under a marital obligation to render
such care and attention to her husband.4 On the other hand, recovery
has usually been allowed where "extraordinary" services were ren-
dered to the injured spouse.5 Medical testimony in the instant case
proved that Polk was a quadriplegic and required extraordinary atten-
tion." The court reasoned that Polk's insurer had an absolute statutory
'Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 388 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
'Section 7 provides in part:
The association shall furnish such medical aid, hospital services, nursing,
chiropractice services, and medicines as may reasonably be required at the time
of the injury and at any time thereafter to cure and relieve from the effects
naturally resulting from the injury. If the association fails to so furnish rea-
sonable medical aid, hospital services, nursing, chiropractic services and medi-
cines as and when needed after notice of the injury to the association or
subscriber, the injured employee may provide said medical aid, nursing,
hospital services, chiropractic services, and medicines at the cost and expense
of the association .The employee shall not be entitled to recover any amount
expended or incurred by him for said medical aid, hospital services, nursing,
chiropractic services, or medicines, nor shall any person who supplied the
same be entitled to recover of the association therefor, unless the association
or subscriber shall have had notice of the injury and shall have refused, failed
or neglected to furnish it or them within a reasonable time.
'Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Wilbanks, 60 Ga. App. 620, 4 S.E.2d 916 (1939); Graf v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797 (1951); Claus v. DeVere, 120
Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
5 Recovery for extraordinary services has been permitted in many jurisdictions. See
California Cas. Ind. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Com'n, 84 Cal. App.2d 417, 190 P.2d
990 (1948); Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1961); Brinson v. South-
eastern Utilities Serv. Co., 72 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1954); Brown v. Dennis, 114 So.2d 335
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Crunkelton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 265, 177 A.2d
252 (1962); Collins v. Reed-Harlin Grocery Co., 230 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950);
Daugherty v. City of Monett, 238 Mo. App. 924, 192 S.W.2d 51 (1946); Berkowitz v.
Highmount Hotel, 281 App. Div. 1000, 120 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1953) .
' Such services included cutting up his food, holding a glass or cup while he drinks,
turning him over in bed every two hours, raising and lowering him in bed, seeing that he
does not become malpositioned in bed, keeping him and the bed clean and dry to avoid
ulcers, rubbing his skin with alcohol, keeping him covered at night, providing medication
for him during his sleepless nights, draining his urine bag, and cleaning Mr. Polk and
changing the bed linens following his bowel movements.
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duty to furnish a nurse to perform these extraordinary services (and
seemingly all services usually performed by a trained nurse). Thus, if
the employer or insurer refuses to perform his statutory duty, who-
ever renders such services--even a wife-is entitled to compensation.
I.I.M.
See note 3 supra.
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